http://www.vcstar.com/news/2010/may/18/state-lands-commissions-reaffirms-opposition-to/
Ventura County Star
By Timm Herdt
Posted May 18, 2010 at 6:56 p.m.
SACRAMENTO – Delivering what could be the knockout punch to a Texas-based oil company’s plans to drill for oil in state waters off Santa Barbara County, the State Lands Commission on Tuesday said the proposal remains fatally flawed.

The Plains Exploration and Production Co. and its environmental supporters in Santa Barbara had hoped that a revised agreement, under which the company pledges a long-term cessation of all oil activities in the area in exchange for short-term permission to tap into state reserves, would lead state regulators to remove their opposition.

But in a memo to commissioners on Tuesday, Executive Director Paul Thayer concluded, “The new agreement does not cure the factors that led the commission to determine the proposed leases were not in the best interests of the state.”

That opinion, coming on the heels of Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger’s decision earlier this month to abandon his support for the Tranquillon Ridge project, makes it unlikely the company will ask the commission to reconsider its January 2009 decision to reject the project.

“I really think this is the final nail,” said Susan Jordan, founder of the nonprofit Coastal Protection Network and a leading opponent of the plan. “Given the staff’s very thorough analysis, I don’t know how PXP moves forward at this point.”

Last month the Santa Barbara-based Environmental Defense Center released its revised agreement with PXP in the hope it would satisfactorily address concerns previously expressed by the commission.

EDC attorney Linda Krop said she was disappointed with Thayer’s analysis.
“We responded to specific complaints,” she said. “Now they say that’s not good enough.”

A key point of contention is whether the federal Minerals Management Service – the agency now under intense national scrutiny in the wake of the ongoing Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico – would be obliged to accept a decision by PXP to walk away from its federal oil leases as it promises to do under the agreement.

Krop said that after discussions with MMS officials she determined the federal government’s only recourse if it felt PXP prematurely abandoned a lease would be to impose fines to recapture any lost royalty payments.

“The MMS confirmed to us that PXP has the right to relinquish its lease at any time,” she said. “They cannot force them to continue to drill. If they decide there are still recoverable reserves, their remedy would be monetary.”

The Lands Commission memo, however, said federal regulations allow the MMS to take more severe steps. “Money damages may not be sufficient for the service, as it sees energy supply as an important aspect of offshore oil development,” the memo says.

In an interview, Thayer said it would not be possible for the federal government to commit in advance to accept the drilling end dates called for in the agreement.

“When she says she has a definitive answer from MMS, I disagree with that,” Thayer said, referring to Krop’s assurances.

“The fundamental problem is that the unbound partner to the agreement is the MMS. The federal government controls those leases.”

Thayer said that although PXP pledges under the agreement to abandon three platforms and ask the owners to take them down, the incentive to keep them in place would be strong because there are an estimated 150 million barrels in unleased federal reserves that could be accessed in the future by slant-drilling from those platforms.

Alaska Dispatch
May 18, 2010

 http://www.alaskadispatch.com/voices/tundra-talk/5381-offshore-oil-industry-in-gulf-of-mexico-needs-citizen-oversight

Commentary by  Mark Swanson | May 18, 2010

Alaskans who were here for the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989 are surely dismayed by recent events in the Gulf of Mexico.

There, as in Prince William Sound, the oil industry and its government regulators promised Americans the chance of disaster was negligible. They promised that, if there was a spill, they could clean it up with a minimum of harm.

Once again, they were wrong on both counts.

Once again, a beautiful body of water has been fouled by a catastrophic oil spill, damaging the natural and human environments.

Once again, government and industry have shown themselves incapable of fast, effective response. Nearly a month has passed since BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig blew up and killed 11 workers. Despite the valiant efforts of tens of thousands of responders, the leak has not been stopped, nor have the millions of gallons of oil spewed out been effectively cleaned up. Some has been skimmed off or burned, but, clearly, the majority of it is still in the water, in either raw or dispersed form.

While Alaskans should be dismayed by this sorry spectacle, they shouldn’t be surprised. We’ve come to expect the worst when it comes to effective regulation of big business by government. That certainly seems to have been the case in the Gulf, where the oil industry and its regulators appear to have learned almost nothing about the need for prevention and preparedness from the disaster in Prince William Sound 21 years ago.

In the Sound itself, though, the picture is different. There, the lessons of the Exxon Valdez are still in active effect today.

In the Sound, prevention is still a high priority. Single-hull oil tankers like the Exxon Valdez no longer operate there. Every loaded oil tanker is escorted by two powerful rescue tugs in case of emergency. In addition, a radar system near Bligh Reef detects icebergs like those that played a role in the Exxon Valdez grounding.

Response also remains a high priority. The oil industry must be ready to clean up 300,000 barrels of oil within 72 hours. A major part of the system for doing so is Alaska’s commercial fishermen. Alyeska Pipeline, in charge of the first 72 hours of response to tanker spills in the Sound, keeps over 300 fishing vessels under contract for oil-spill response; some are required to be ready to respond within six hours of notification.

Why are the lessons of the Exxon Valdez still actively debated and enforced in Prince William Sound?

When Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it identified complacency as a cause of the Exxon spill. “One way to combat this complacency,” Congress declared, “is to involve local citizens in the process of preparing, adopting, and revising oil spill contingency plans.”

As in Alaska, the oil industry in the Gulf of Mexico comprises a large segment of the region’s economy, employment, and tax base. That dependency creates some reluctance to compel costly safeguards or business-impeding environmental controls.

Citizen oversight operates on a basic moral imperative: Those with the most to lose from pollution must have a voice in decisions that put their livelihoods and communities at risk. In Prince William Sound, the citizen voice has been crucial in numerous safety improvements since the Exxon spill, from double-hull requirements to the adoption of high-performance escort tugs to the development of iceberg detection technology, and even elimination of the release of toxic benzene vapors when tankers load oil.

The legislation sure to grow out of the Gulf spill will likely address the need for better regulation of offshore oil development and perhaps raise liability limits on oil spillers.

We think Congress should also consider making citizen oversight a key part of the system to ensure nothing like BP’s Gulf spill happens again.

Citizen oversight isn’t good just for the environment — it’s also good for the affected industry, because it helps the industry get things right the first time.

And that’s absolutely crucial in preventing catastrophes like the Exxon and BP oil spills.

Mark Swanson is executive director of the
Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council.’

.The views expressed are the writer’s own and are not endorsed by Alaska Dispatch.

Special thanks to Richard Charter

http://www.propublica.org/ion/blog/item/In-Gulf-Spill-BP-Using-Dispersants-Banned-in-UK

The ProPublica Blog

In Gulf Spill, BP Using Dispersants Banned in U.K.

by Marian Wang, ProPublica – May 18, 2010 2:24 pm EDT
The two types of dispersants BP is spraying in the Gulf are banned for use [1] on oil spills in the U.K. As EPA-approved products [2], BP has been using them in greater quantities than dispersants have ever been used [3] in the history of US oil spills.
BP is using two products from a line of dispersants called Corexit [4], which EPA data [2] appears to show is more toxic and less effective [5] on South Louisiana crude than other available dispersants, according to Greenwire.
We learned about the U.K. ban from a mention on the New York Times’ website. (The reference was cut from later versions of the article, so we can’t link to the Times, but we found the piece [6] elsewhere.) The Times flagged a letter [7] Rep. Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, sent to the EPA yesterday. The letter pointed out that both the Corexit products currently being used in the Gulf were removed from a list of approved treatments for oil spills in the UK more than a decade ago. (Here’s the letter [7].)
As we’ve reported, Corexit was also used after Exxon Valdez [8] and was “later linked with health impacts in people including respiratory, nervous system, liver, kidney and blood disorders.” One of the two Corexit products also contains a compound associated with “headaches, vomiting and reproductive problems at high doses [9].”
Given that the dispersants are EPA-approved, the choice on which ones to use was left to BP, which had stockpiled large amounts of Corexit and is now ordering more.
BP has defended its choice to use Corexit. A BP spokesman called the product [5] “pretty effective,” and said it had been “rigorously tested.” It is not testing other dispersants, said [5] a spokesman, because it’s focusing on stopping the spill. Mani Ramesh, Nalco’s chief technology officer, disputed claims that its product is harmful to the environment [10], telling Reuters that Corexit’s active ingredient is “an emulsifier also found in ice cream.”
Although Corexit seems to be one of the more toxic choices available, dispersants themselves have the effect of breaking up oil into droplets that linger longer in the water instead of collecting at the surface.
The choice to use them is inherently an environmental tradeoff. Their use in the Gulf spill has limited the instances-and images-of oil-covered seabirds, but has kept effects of the spill mostly underwater. Scientists have discovered giant plumes of dispersed oil [11] in the deep waters of the Gulf, though the EPA has said “there is no information currently available [12]” to link the dispersants to those deep-sea plumes. The plumes are now fast approaching the Gulf loop current [13], which could spread the oil into the Atlantic Ocean.
In a hearing this afternoon, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson told the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works that the EPA is working with BP to get less toxic dispersants [14] to the site as quickly as possible, according to Kate Sheppard of Mother Jones.
The EPA, while recognizing long-term effects on the environment are unknown [15], has said that the federal government will regularly analyze [16] the effect of dispersants, and that it will discontinue the application of dispersants underwater [17] “if any negative impacts on the environment outweigh the benefits.”
Write Marian.Wang@propublica.org [18].

Special thanks to Richard Charter

http://www.ogj.com/index/article-display/0688605868/articles/oil-gas-journal/general-interest-2/hse/2010/05/bp-says_it_s_collecting/QP129867/cmpid=EnlDailyMay182010.html

of course if the flowrate is really 17,000 bbl per day….

May 17, 2010
(This story was updated with 2,000 b/d figure, Loop Current details on May 18)
Paula Dittrick
OGJ Senior Staff Writer

HOUSTON, May 17 — A riser insertion tool was estimated to be collecting 2,000 b/d of oil leaking from a deepwater well off Louisiana, which was double the volume that spill response crews had collected the previous day from the estimated 5,000 b/d oil spill.

Doug Suttles, chief operating officer of BP Exploration & Production, told reporters during a May 17 news conference from Robert, La., that the tool was collecting 1,000 b/d. Early on May 18, BP updated that figure to 2,000 b/d.

The tool is a 4-in. steel pipe inserted about 5 ft into a 21-in. damaged riser on the seabed. Oil and gas have been leaking out of the end of the damaged riser, which is about 600 ft from the runaway Macondo well on Mississippi Canyon Block 252. A blowout resulted in a fire and explosion on Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible rig on Apr. 20, leaving 11 crew members missing and presumed dead. BP operates the block.

On May 16, BP successfully started collecting oil and gas from the end of the damaged riser. The hydrocarbons are being transported by a riser to the Transocean Discoverer Enterprise drillship on the surface 5,000 ft above the seabed.

“This remains a new technology, and both its continued operation and its effectiveness in capturing the oil and gas remain uncertain,” BP said.

Meanwhile, Suttles said a “top kill” technique could be used possibly during the weekend to stop the flow from the well. Heavy fluids will be pumped through choke and kill lines on the existing blowout preventer into the well.

The choke and kill lines are two 3-in. lines. Weight of the heavy fluids is much heavier than the oil. The mud will be followed by cement to seal the well.

“We will never produce oil from this well,” Suttles said. “We want to very clear about that.” The well has flowed in an uncontrolled manner, and it cannot be repaired, he said. “The right thing to do is to permanently plug this well.”

Ultimately, a relief well will intersect the well at 18,000 ft where cement will be pumped to permanently seal the bottom of the well.

Work on the first relief well, which began on May 2, was interrupted to test the BOP, Suttles said, adding that the semi is expected to resume drilling soon. The first relief well is being drilled by the Transocean Development Driller III semi.

Transocean’s Development Driller II drilling rig began drilling the second relief well on May 16. A relief well takes 3 months to complete. The second relief well is being drilled as a backup in case of the first relief well encounters problems.

Tip of spill very close to Loop Current
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration scientists said ocean models indicate tar balls leading the southern edge of the surface oil slick could begin moving more to the southwest and potentially into the Loop Current, possibly beginning in the evening of May 18. The Loop Current would pull the slick toward the Florida Keys and the east coast of Florida.

Suttles said, “There are not large quantities of thick, heavy oil anywhere around the spill. Most of the spill is this thin sheen.”

Speaking at the news conference, NOAA scientist Charlie Henry said information from research vessel R/V Pelican has yet to be analyzed. “Layers of oil are totally untrue,” Henry said of some weekend media reports regarding possible underwater plumes of oil.

NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco issued a news release May 17 saying some media reports were, “misleading, premature, and in some cases, inaccurate.”  On May 18, she had a news conference to tell reporters that the leading-edge tip of the sheen was very close to the Loop Current.
“A lot depends on what the ocean currents do and what the winds do,” Lubchenco said. “A lot will depend on local surface winds and surface conditions.”

Surface spill response
Suttles announced BP has spent more than $500 million on the oil spill response as of May 17.

More than 650 vessels are involved in the response effort on the surface of the sea. Vessels include skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels. Skimming efforts as of May 17 had recovered 151,000 bbl of oily liquid.

The total length of boom deployed as part of efforts to prevent oil reaching the coast was almost 1.7 million ft, including over 400,000 ft of sorbent boom.

More than 19,000 people from BP, other companies, and government agencies were involved in the response as of May 17.

Contact Paula Dittrick at paulad@ogjonline.com.

 
 
Opening Statement – May 18, 2010
 
Administration Response to Deepwater Horizon Disaster
 
“This is our second hearing on the continuing disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.  The purpose of this and future hearings is to understand the cascade of failures that caused the catastrophic blowout of the oil well being drilled by the Deepwater Horizon rig, and to determine what Congress needs to do to ensure that it never happens again.
 
“Last week, we heard from two distinguished technical experts and heads of the three companies responsible for the disaster on what some of those failures might have been.
 
“Next week we will have a hearing on the issue of liability for damages.
 
“Today, we will hear from Secretary of the Interior Salazar and his senior team in charge of responding to this catastrophic failure.  I would like to focus this hearing on the role of regulatory failure in causing this catastrophe.  Along with the failure of technological systems, and failure of the people operating those systems, regulatory failure is one of the three key interlocking breakdowns that I believe are at the heart of the problem.
 
“I believe that there are several dimensions to regulatory failure in this case.
 
“President Obama suggested one, last week, when he cited a ‘cozy’ relationship between the Minerals Management Service, or MMS, and the industry it was regulating.
 
“There are three other regulatory areas that I think bear some close examination in this hearing:
 
1.     Whether we had the right technical standards in place to govern the drilling being undertaken by the Deepwater Horizon rig;
 
2.     Whether we have been taking a ‘systems’ approach to oversight of deepwater drilling operations, with sufficient staff resources and training to match the complexity of what was being undertaken; and
 
3.     Whether we had adequate mechanisms to follow-up on changes being made to the complex drilling operation for this well, as drilling was proceeding.
 
“The first of these forms of possible regulatory failure – the failure to have the right technical standards in place – may be exemplified by the problems in the cementing of the well.  It’s possible that the extent of the cementing was inadequate for this particular well given its other design features.  However, the amount of cement appears to have met the MMS’s technical standard.  In some ways, having a prescriptive standard that is inadequate in certain systems might be worse than not having a standard at all.
 
“The second form of possible regulatory failure – not having a proper ‘systems approach’ – could be a result of a limited and reactive role that MMS seems to have taken over the years toward these highly complex wells.  Many MMS employees do have relevant expertise and are involved in research in key areas of well safety.  In my view, they need to be more fully engaged with industry in reviewing overall design and implementation of these challenging deepwater wells.
 
“Finally, the third form of possible regulatory failure is exemplified by the lack of follow-through on how approved plans are implemented, including the detection and response to unusual occurrences that might warn of bigger problems.  There appear to have been a number of changes in the well plan during its construction, including those involving the number of structural ‘centralizers’ being used and the point at which drilling mud was withdrawn from the well.  These decisions can be driven by cost and the desire to make up lost time on the drilling project, and it is important to ensure that safety is paramount.  This raises an important question — where was the MMS in this process?  Was it consulted?  Does it have an established role that ensures that it will scrutinize major changes to previously approved plans?
 
“We know that MMS inspectors visit rigs to review activities taking place on them, and while the documentary record of inspections on this particular rig appears somewhat cloudy, it was inspected approximately on a monthly basis.  Is this enough?  How are unusual occurrences and abnormal events, which might indicate the need for more frequent inspections, communicated to the MMS in between inspections?  And are inspectors asking the right questions when they do these visits?
 
“Having identified these three broad categories of possible regulatory failure, the question before us all is, what should we be doing next?
 
“First, I believe that we should find out all we can about problems that existed on the Deepwater Horizon are present in other deepwater drilling operations in the Gulf.
 
“Second, that there should be a comprehensive and independent technical review of the precise drilling plan that was proposed for this well.  I hope the Department of the Interior should make the full drilling plan available for peer review by other industry experts.  
 
“Finally, while I have sketched out some broad areas of obvious failure, we are still learning more about the potential root causes of this disaster on a daily basis.  I believe that we need a more thoroughgoing and independent review of the safety and regulation of OCS oil and gas operations generally.  We have profited by such independent assessments after other major disasters, such as Three Mile Island and the loss of the space shuttle Challenger. I am glad to learn that the President intends to charter such a Commission on his own authority, and look forward to it beginning its work soon.”
 
#   #   #
 
Contact Bill Wicker at 202.224.5243 or bill_wicker@energy.senate.gov
Visit our website at http://energy.senate.gov/public/